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Abstract This article starts with an overview of the negotiation on regulatory
coherence in the Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership (TPP), and then discusses its potential
implications for China. The article argues that, the biggest challenge to China is not
the trade diversion caused by the market access commitments in the TPP, but the
regulatory coherence issues. The article then discusses the various initiatives China
has taken at the domestic, bilateral, regional and global levels in response to the
TPP negotiation, and concludes with a critical assessment of the pros and cons of
each initiative.
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1 Introduction
While purporting to be a ‘Trans-Paciﬁc’ trade agreement, the Trans-Paciﬁc Part-
nership (TPP)1 curiously doesn’t include China, which is one of the most important
players in the Paciﬁc. When the TPP negotiations were ﬁrst launched in 2010,
China deemed it as a scheme to contain China and deliberately ignored the
agreement.2 When the negotiations gained more and more momentum in 2012,
China started to take a more realistic approach by paying close attention to the
negotiations and indicated that it would be willing to consider TPP as one of the
possible routes to achieve regional trade integration in Asia Paciﬁc. More recently,
China even indicated its willingness to join the negotiations by noting that the US
has failed to invite China to join the TPP, to which the US replied that China should
be able to meet the high standards before it may be considered as a potential
applicant.
Putting diplomatic speeches aside, the reality remains that China’s accession to
the TPP in the near future is almost impossible. On the other hand, with the recent
grant of the Trade Promotion Authority to President Obama, we will most likely see
the conclusion of the TPP by the end of 2015, if not before. Once concluded, the
TPP will have far-reaching implications not only for its members, but also for other
countries in the region as well, especially China, which is a key link in the regional
supply chains in Asia Paciﬁc.
Many commentators, especially economists, predicated that the TPP will divert
trade away from China to its competitors in the trade group, such as Vietnam and
Mexico. With an ambitious agenda for market access negotiations, coupled with
carefully-crafted rules of origin such as the “yarn-forwarding rule” which aim to
prevent non-members from taking advantage of the tariff concessions, the TPP will
certainly create obstacles for Chinese exports to key markets such as the
US. However, it is still possible for China to bypass these obstacles through creative
use of certain exceptions such as the “short-supply list” and relocating its factories
to TPP members. In contrast, it would be much harder for China to deal with the
challenges brought by the efforts by TPP members to harmonize the regulatory
regimes on a variety of issues across the region, as there are no easy ways to
circumvent the regulatory barriers.
This article will start with an overview of the negotiations on regulatory coher-
ence issues in the TPP, then discuss the implications for China, followed by a
critical review of China’s attempts to deal with the challenge.
1 This article was completed in July 2015 and all information are up to date until July 2015. For an
overview of the TPP, see United States Trade Representative (USTR), Overview of the Trans
Paciﬁc Partnership, https://ustr.gov/tpp/overview-of-the-TPP (last accessed 5 August 2015).
2 For a detailed analysis on China’s changing attitudes towards the TPP, see Gao (2014),
pp. 77–98.
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2 Regulatory Coherence in the TPP
From the very beginning, the leading protagonist of the TPP, the US, has made clear
that the TPP is not just about market access, but more importantly about making
rules for the twenty-ﬁrst century. In the Outlines of the TPP agreement agreed in
Honolulu, Hawaii on November 12, 2011, the TPP members listed regulatory
coherence as one of the key cross-cutting issues in the agreement and called for
commitments that “will promote trade between the countries by making trade
among them more seamless and efﬁcient”.3
As noted by Bollyky, regulatory coherence is not a new concept and has evolved
through three tracks, i.e., the regulatory reform movement at the domestic level, the
promotion of good regulatory practices at the WTO, and bilateral and regional
efforts on regulatory cooperation and convergence.4 According to him, a twenty-
ﬁrst century approach to regulatory coherence should focus on inter-governmental
cooperation and include the following elements: an integrated approach that takes
into consideration of both trade liberalization and other legitimate regulatory objec-
tives; a joint institute to formulate common technical regulations and standards; and
a ﬂexible scope that may be expanded to address future emergent regulatory
concerns and trade barriers.5 However, due to resistances from domestic constitu-
encies, Bollyky predicted that the TPP chapter would focus on inter-governmental
regulatory reform rather than intra-governmental regulatory coherence.6
Bollysky’s prediction is largely conﬁrmed by the October 2011 leaked draft on
the regulatory coherence chapter, which mainly focuses on the establishment of
coordination mechanisms and implementation of best practices at the domestic
level.7 However, the recently adopted Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities
and Accountability Act of 2015 seems to take a different approach by mandating
US negotiators to seek to “promote regulatory compatibility through harmoniza-
tion, equivalence, or mutual recognition of different regulations and standards and
to encourage the use of international and interoperable standards”.8 Indeed, the
inclusion of more inter-governmental cooperation is not impossible given the long
history of regulatory cooperation among some TPP members, such as the Trans-
Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement between Australia and New Zealand.9
No matter which approach is taken, it seems certain that the regulatory regimes
of the TPP members will be subject to heavy inﬂuence from the US, as we can see
from the detailed languages in the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and
3USTR, Outlines of TPP, https://ustr.gov/tpp/outlines-of-TPP (last accessed 5 August 2015).
4 Bollyky (2012), pp. 174–178.
5 Bollyky (2012), pp. 178–181.
6 Bollyky (2012), pp. 181–182.
7 http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/TransPaciﬁcRegulatoryCoherence.
pdf (last accessed 5 August 2015).
8 H.R. 2146.
9 See Bollyky (2012), pp. 176–177.
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Accountability Act on various regulatory issues ranging from e-commerce to labour
and environment provisions.
3 Implications for China
While regulatory coherence can help reduce trade costs for ﬁrms from TPP mem-
bers, it will most likely have a negative impact on non-TPP member countries. This
is because compliance with diverse regulatory requirements is increasingly costly
for ﬁrms, and can easily offset savings gained from other factors of input such as
labor and raw materials. Thus, once the TPP comes into being, Chinese ﬁrms will
become the most direct victims, as their customers will discover that it is much
cheaper to source their imports from TPP members with fewer regulatory barriers.
Some Chinese ﬁrms may try to meet the technical standards prevailing in TPP
countries by sending their products for testing in these countries, but this will add to
their production costs. Moreover, they might even be denied the opportunity due to
systemic problems in the regulatory regimes (such as those on labor and environ-
ment) in the home country and these are beyond their controls.
In addition to the negative impacts on individual Chinese ﬁrms, the TPP
regulatory coherence package will also foil China’s efforts to develop domestic
standards through promotion of indigenous innovation programs. For the last two
decades, China has been trying to develop its own technical standards on issues
ranging from mobile 3G network (TD-SCDMA), Wi-Fi (WAPI), to DVD format
(EVD). As the TPP harmonizes the technical standards in these areas, most foreign
ﬁrms and even many domestic Chinese ﬁrms will ﬁnd it makes more sense for them
to comply with the standards in the TPP rather than those in China.
Last but not least, the TPP will makes it more difﬁcult for China to inﬂuence
rule-making at the global level. While the current membership of the TPP is limited
to only 12 countries,10 most of these countries are key players in the WTO.
Moreover, given the ambition of the US in launching the TPP negotiations, it is
very likely to further expand to include other key economies. With the support of
these countries, it would be much easier for the US to push its agenda on various
regulatory issues into the WTO. Conversely, China would ﬁnd it more and more
difﬁcult to resist the demands from the US and its allies.
10 The current members include the US, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan,
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam.
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4 China’s Responses
When the TPP negotiations were ﬁrst launched, China wasn’t sure what to make of
it and simply chose to ignore it. As the negotiations gained more and more
momentum, China started to take it seriously and even indicated its willingness to
seek accession. As stated by the Mexican Economy Secretary Bruno Ferrari when
Mexico applied to join the TPP in late 2011, “the most important part is to
participate in designing the rules of the TPP, not just enter into the TPP”.11 By
entering the TPP negotiations, China could play some role in designing the new
rules. However, the US probably will not want China’s participation before the
conclusion of the negotiations as it would make it more difﬁcult for the US to
control the direction of the negotiations. Moreover, even if China manages to get in,
it has to face procedural hurdles in the accession process. While there are no explicit
rules on accession, the experience of other countries which have joined the TPP
negotiations half-way suggested that the following are the likely steps for new
applicants:12
First, in terms of the process, the applicant has to consult with current TPP
members on a bilateral basis, in addition to meeting in parallel with TPP members
as a group.13 Second, in terms of the substance, the country has to demonstrate that
it can “live up to the high standards of the TPP agreement”14 by addressing issues of
concern for all TPP members, and must be willing to make concessions in speciﬁc
areas of interests.15 For example, when Japan applied, it was asked to provide better
access for U.S. agricultural exports such as beef, market access for autos, pharma-
ceuticals and medical devices, as well as insurance services.16 Also, the new
member has to accept everything that has been agreed by existing members in the
new negotiations and may not re-open any concluded issue for discussion.17 Third,
to admit a new member, the existing members have to reach a consensus decision.
11 Inside US Trade, Mexico Expects TPP Countries To Consider New Entrants At March Round,
23 December 2011.
12 Inside US Trade, TPP Countries Say Canada Not Ready to Join Talks, Press Vietnam to Decide,
22 October 2011.
13 Inside US Trade, TPP Countries Say Canada Not Ready to Join Talks, Press Vietnam to Decide,
22 October 2011; See also Inside US Trade, Brady Says New TPP Entrants Must Address Bilateral
Trade Issues, 16 December 2011; Inside US Trade, Marantis Sees New Entrants On ‘Separate
Track’ From TPP Negotiations, 16 December 2011.
14 Inside US Trade, USTR Intensiﬁes Focus On TPP In Face Of Potential New Entrants.
9 December 2011.
15 Inside US Trade, Canadian Minister Says Canada Ready To Meet, Exceed TPP Standards,
23 December 2011.
16 Inside US Trade, Brady Says New TPP Entrants Must Address Bilateral Trade Issues,
16 December 2011.
17 Inside US Trade, Congress, Administration to Consult on Possible Japan TPP Participation,
18 November, 2011; Inside US Trade, USTR Intensiﬁes Focus On TPP In Face Of Potential New
Entrants. 9 December 2011.
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Of course, for obvious reasons, the view of the US is the most important.18 Fourth,
before being admitted as a full member, an applicant may start out as an “associate
member”. As such, the applicant may observe three rounds of negotiations without
having to assume all the responsibilities of the full members. However, it must
commit to full participation by the time of the fourth round.
Given the complicated accession process, again China could be subject to high
demands from the existing members, especially the US. Thus, this is not an
attractive option to China.
As China could not participate in the rule-making efforts in the TPP, it is left
with only one choice, i.e., making its own rules. This is indeed what China has been
doing for the past two years, and it involves initiatives at three levels.
First, at the domestic level, China has been introducing various reform measures.
Some of these were launched by the Central Government as part of the nation-wide
reform plan. Others were ﬁrst tested in the so-called Free Trade Zones (FTZ). First
piloted in the Pudong area in Shanghai in September 2013, the China (Shanghai)
Pilot FTZ (SPFTZ) aims to become China’s testing ground for new regulatory
regimes on trade and investment. Initially covering only 28 km2, the SPFTZ quickly
introduced many new regulatory reforms in a host of areas:19
1. Investment regulation: these include the use of negative-listing rather than the
traditional positive listing approach to regulate foreign investment; replacing the
old approval system with a new registration system for foreign investments in
areas which are not subject to the negative list; a “single window” registration
system for the establishment of new ﬁrms; and further liberalization of the
investment in the services sector;
2. Customs regulation: these include full liberalization of imports into the SPFTZ;
the establishment of a “single window” system for international trade; and
differentiated regulatory framework based on the customs risks of individual
goods;
3. Financial regulation: these include several regulatory innovations to further
promote the internalization of the Renminbi; further improvement of the ﬁnan-
cial services market; and introducing new ways to deal with ﬁnancial risks
through prudential regulations.
4. Shift of government function: In this area, the SPFTZ tries to switch from the old
ex ante regulatory system to a system that reduces entry barriers and regulate
through post facto monitoring of market players. The measures include national
security review, anti-monopoly review, establishment of a social credit system,
publication of ﬁrms’ annual reports, sharing of information among regulatory
18 Inside US Trade, Groser Says U.S. Holds Biggest Sway In Decision On New TPP Entrants,
23 December 2011.
19 Shizhengfu Xinwen Fabuhui Tongbao Zimao Shiyanqu Yunxing Yinian Yilai de Qingkuang
(Municipal Government Held Press Conference to Report on the Progress made during the
ﬁrst Year of the SPFTZ), Ofﬁcial website of the SPFTZ, 11 October 2014, http://www.china-
shftz.gov.cn/NewsDetail.aspx?NID¼afa679c5-7495-4436-959a-cd2b1957eb19&MenuType¼3&
CID¼b90374c0-e6e6-4cfe-9cfe-1a365ad8fd77 (last accessed 5 August 2015).
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authorities and coordination of enforcement measures, and encouraging
non-governmental actors to help monitor markets.
Once these reform measures were proven successful in the SPFTZ, they were
then selected by the Central Government for adoption across the country. To
provide more room for regulatory innovation, in early 2015, the Central Govern-
ment added three more pilot FTZs in Tianjin, Guangdong and Fujian, and further
expanded the area of the SPFTZ to 120 km2.
Second, at the bilateral and regional level, China has been experimenting with
various new regulatory approaches. For example, in its Bilateral Investment Treaty
negotiation with the US, China agreed to, for the ﬁrst time, the use of negative
listing approach and the grant of pre-establishment rights to foreign investors.20 In
its latest FTA signed with Australia, China also agreed to cooperate with Australia
on a variety of regulatory issues ranging from Technical Barriers to Trade,21
Financial Services22 and Electronic Commerce.23 There are also talks of including
regulatory issues in the negotiations on other regional initiatives by China, such as
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement24 and the ‘One Belt
One Road’ initiative.25
Third, at the global level, China has also been trying very hard to participate in
rule-making initiatives in various fora. For example, in the WTO, China actively
supported the negotiation on the Trade Facilitation Agreement. Beyond the WTO,
China has also been actively seeking participation in other regulatory initiatives
such as the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), but unfortunately hasn’t made
much progress due to strong resistance from the US.
20 Jingji Cankao (Economic Information), Di 11 Lun Zhongmei Touzi Xieding Tanpan Juxing,
Huo She Fumian Qingdan Neirong (China and US to hold the 11th Round of Negotiations on the
Bilateral Investment Treaty, May Discuss Issues on Negative Listing), 15 January 2014, http://
jjckb.xinhuanet.com/2014-01/15/content_487189.htm (last accessed 5 August 2015).
21 Ch. 6 of the China Australia Free Trade Agreement.
22 Annex 8-B of the China Australia Free Trade Agreement.
23 Ch. 12 of the China Australia Free Trade Agreement.
24 According to the NZ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the RCEP negotiations are supposed
to cover issues such as competition policy, investment, intellectual property rights, and even labor
and environmental issues. See Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), http://
www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/2-Trade-Relationships-and-Agreements/RCEP/
#negs (last accessed 5 August 2015).
25 The One Road and One Belt Initiative refers to the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century
Maritime Silk Road, which seeks to enhance the economic link between China and countries in
Central and Western Asia, and Southeast Asia, South Asia and Africa, respectively. See Xinhua,
Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk
Road, Issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, with State Council authorization,
March 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/bilingual/2015-03/28/c_134105922.htm (last
accessed 5 August 2015).
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5 Conclusion
To summarize, even though China has been excluded from the TPP negotiations,
the progress in the TPP, especially that on regulatory coherence, has pushed China
to re-think its strategy on trade liberalization and regulatory reform. As China
realized that it would run the risk of being marginalized without regulatory reform,
it has been experimenting with reform initiatives at various levels. So far, most
progress has been made at the domestic level, where various regulatory reform
measures were introduced in China’s new generation of FTZs. This is unsurprising,
as China would have most autonomy for the domestic reforms. However, the
limitation to this approach is that such reform measures are mainly introduced by
local governments, while the reforms on many deeper regulatory issues needs the
sanction of the central government and even external pressure from foreign gov-
ernments. That is also why China has also been actively engaged in negotiations on
regulatory coherence issues at the bilateral, regional and multilateral levels as well.
These initiatives can help China to catch up with the best practices of regulatory
reform at the international level, but as these negotiations typically involve trade-
offs between different sectors and regulatory coherence issues are often used as
bargaining chips, how much impact they can have on China’s regulatory reform is
still an open question. Nonetheless, by leading China to the negotiating table, these
initiatives have at least taken an important step towards the right direction.
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